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as Productive Tool Use”
Summary:
This paper is discussing some central points in a dis-
sertation for the degree of dr. phil., “Regulation as Pro-
ductive Tool Use – a Participatory Observation in the 
Control Room of a District Heating System.” An earlier 
version of the paper was presented by the author as part 
of the defense of the dissertation at Roskilde University 
Center June 14 2002. As suggested by the title, the 
dissertation was an empirical study of regulation in a 
control room. The object of the authors participatory 
observation was how the operators in the control room 
followed rules when they regulated a highly automated 
plant. When I was shown the plant I was told that the 
technology ran smoothly and without error. Its control 
structures are based on formal logic and mechanical 
principles, all the same human beings are required in 
the control room to take care of anomalies. Among 
other things, the observations provide an opportunity 
to discuss the limitations of psychologies that study 
human beings on the basis of formal principles.
 The present paper focuses on two characteristic 
aspects of this discussion in the dissertation. First, it 
takes its point of departure in some practical problems 
of the control structures of the control room. It will 
demonstrate that the practical problems are problems 
of principle, and that formal principles are not adequate 
to study the object of human sciences, namely, human 
beings.
 Second, it sketches out what is required of a concep-
tion of human beings. As human beings are trusted to 
handle anomalies, we must explain how they are able 
to act on an incomplete understanding of the situation. 
And since they are able to identify what is wrong, we 
must explain how they develop new knowledge.
The paper presented at the defense summarized the 
main arguments of the dissertation and alluded to an 
expansion of the main point using a particular instance. 
Here the weight is shifted to the latter expansion.
The Control Room as a Basis 
For Differentiating Formal 
Systems and Subjectivity
To illustrate how the operators identify errors 
in the course of regulation we shall examine 
a brief episode from the control room. Before 
going into this observational material, howev-
er, we shall describe the plant they were regu-
lating. Then we shall look round the control 
room and discuss the problems that force us to 
differentiate between machines and subjectiv-
ity. Following that, the observational material 
will be discussed.
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In the control room the operators regulated 
the fl ow of water of a district heating system 
that involved 52 km of pipelines in the Copen-
hagen underground. Power plants produce heat 
and distribute it to the district heating system 
and electric power production facilities. The 
system delivers hot water from power plants to 
end-users. The end-users may be local district 
heating systems or homes. The district heating 
system can thus be understood as an aspect of 
the distributed functions of societal heat and 
power production.
Although it is ultimately necessary to un-
derstand such activities as occurring within 
distributed functions, it is customary to sepa-
rate work functions in industrial plants and to 
perform them one at the time for the sake of 
effi ciency. According to this way of doing 
things, regulation of the system is separated 
from other functions by being located in the 
control room. This has been made possible 
by the technology of electronic control struc-
tures. The isolation of the function is mirrored 
in the design of the room. Originally it had 
air-conditioning but no windows. It was thus 
isolated from diurnal rhythms, climate, and 
the plant itself. It may have seemed a good 
idea to the designers of early control rooms 
to promote operators concentration and effi -
ciency. But the operators asked for windows 
because their regulation consisted of fi nding 
connections. Windows allowed them to view 
the weather and the position of the sun while 
making regulatory decisions. Moreover, the 
designers of the work functions in the present 
district heating system allowed the operators 
to make their rounds in the plant and thus con-
nect with repairmen performing the various 
repairs. Also, the technology of the electronic 
control structures actually made it possible to 
regulate the system from anywhere and to in-
tegrate regulation with other activities. In fact, 
the system could be regulated from a Pacifi c 
island or from the street if need be. More re-
alistically, there had even been plans to have 
the operators regulate the system from their 
homes, thus combining work and family life 
that have become separated since the advent 
of mass production.
The fully automated plant of the district 
heating system runs according to control struc-
tures executed as computer programs. When 
human beings regulate a plant running with 
such a control structure, the problems arising 
from practice provide an opportunity to prop-
erly differentiate the processes involved, and 
thus to get a better understanding of themselves 
and of the plant as well.
The identifi cation of what is human and 
what is machine is not easy to make. There 
are many possibilities. One might fi nd that 
subjects and control structures in the comput-
ers are alike: they both process information 
with logical structures. Or one might fi nd that 
the processes are different: the computer proc-
esses bits with structures of logic automatically 
and without insight, while human beings act 
on insight. Moreover, any difference can be 
ascribed to the one or the other. For example, 
it could be claimed that the insight of human 
beings does not differentiate them from com-
puter programs, since programs represent the 
logic of insight, confi rming once again that 
subjects and computers are alike. To fi nd a 
distinction based on experience one must bring 
together a host of aspects from different prac-
tices. This was attempted in the dissertation 
and is summarized and elaborated somewhat 
in the present paper.
A good way to begin the differentiation 
between subject and control structure is to in-
vestigate a concrete instance. An instance with 
profound implications for the differentiation of 
subjects and the plant will be examined, that of 
spurious alarms. These reveal a fundamental 
problem of formal systems and demonstrate 
the limits of their determinate stability.
The control structures of the fully auto-
mated district heating system appear to be 
perfect, as if errors in the automated system 
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should be impossible. Nevertheless, surpris-
ing accidents occur (cf. Perrow, 1984). This 
apparent contradiction can be investigated by 
examining the problem of spurious automatic 
alarms. They were an everyday annoyance in 
the control room, and at a conference organ-
ized by a control room association the reasons 
for the spurious alarms were a topic of con-
versation in the hallways of the conference 
building. The designers set alarms to go off 
when any measured indicator exceed a speci-
fi ed range. If a reading is outside the range 
or if a confi guration of readings is considered 
to be not appropriate, an alarm sounds. This 
effect is achieved by a simple control state-
ment in a formal language on a computer. It 
appears to be a wonder of modern technology: 
the system can think for itself. But in fact the 
operators claimed that the alarms were a nui-
sance, since many of them are false alarms. 
It is easy to see why there are so many false 
alarms. Sometimes a reading must be out of 
range to avoid another more precarious devia-
tion. Sometimes an apparently dangerous con-
fi guration of readings is perfectly safe because 
other conditions are met that were not specifi ed 
for sounding the alarm. In such cases, it turns 
out that no action is required, even though an 
alarm sounds. The alarm is spurious. Moreo-
ver, the operators stressed that when nothing 
happened it could mean that something was 
wrong. Once an operator wondered why the 
phone did not ring for a few hours. When he 
lifted the receiver he discovered there was no 
dial-tone. An apparently normal state may be 
an alarm state, an apparent alarm state may be 
a normal state, and a response is not necessary 
in some alarm states, while it is necessary in 
some apparently normal states. We might say 
that an alarm is a regular irregularity, since the 
alarm appears regularly and the regularity of 
the control structures cannot handle all of the 
states properly. In the dissertation such phe-
nomena are described as “the vengeance of the 
concrete”. They are seen as an indication of the 
fact that the most disparate things go together 
in the most surprising manner and produce 
unexpected events on which action must be 
taken. This circumstance has serious conse-
quences for the assessment of risks in high-tech 
plants. In the 1970s scientists believed that it 
would be possible to calculate the frequency 
of accidents in automated plants in advance. 
But such calculations can only have real value 
if plants are isolated entities in which literally 
all possible types of events can be listed. It 
occurred once that a candle was left lit in a 
cable tunnel causing an incident in a nuclear 
power plant. Some of the scientists saw the 
implication: the candle left was not an event 
contained in the list of possible events used for 
computation. This meant that the list was not 
complete, not closed, because the plant was not 
an isolated entity. The plant was, among other 
things, subject to the unanticipated odd acts of 
a repair man needing to see what he was doing 
in a cable tunnel. However strictly a plant is 
managed, “the vengeance of the concrete” can-
not be avoided. We cannot specify events in 
such complete detail that the unexpected con-
nections in regulation can be specifi ed before 
the fact. Therefore the surprises can only be 
acknowledged when they happen. This makes 
not only complete statistical computation im-
possible but also the expansion of the control 
structures to achieve complete control. Such 
expansion also depends on listing all possible 
events to be regulated in advance.
Now, as can be seen from the discussion 
of the assessment of risk and from the opti-
mistic installation of automatic alarms, some 
believe that “the vengeance of the concrete” is 
a practical problem that can be solved within 
the framework of the theories used for risk as-
sessment and control structures. But in fact, it 
can be argued, “the vengeance of the concrete” 
points to fundamental problems in those ap-
proaches, problems that cannot be overcome 
within their understandings.
To get an idea of the problems we shall 
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examine the control structures and the nature 
of those formal systems with which they are 
managed. The issues referred to are funda-
mental and extensive. This is because of the 
implied relationship between causal and formal 
structures. To come to a full understanding of 
the problems involved, the issues should be 
considered from several perspectives: philo-
sophical, evolutionary, and historical. This 
task is undertaken in the dissertation. The 
fundamental issues are present in various 
forms everywhere: they are certainly present 
in the confrontation between man and machine 
in the district heating system that we shall be 
discussing. But even here the validity of the 
deliberations depends on the limitations of for-
mal systems and their alleged consequences. 
In the dissertation they are spelled out in some 
detail; here only the main outline of the limita-
tions is given.
Control structures of machines can take 
many forms. They have appeared as holes 
punched in bands of cardboard that curbed 
the patterns of weaving in weaving machines. 
A later example is that of mechanical relays 
opening and closing valves in chemical plants. 
Now they are mostly electronic impulses emit-
ted from computers. All these different control 
structures work in such a way that can be mim-
icked by formal systems consisting of prede-
fi ned symbols and operations. A production 
system is a design of symbols and operations. 
The symbols have pre-set limitations on their 
values, and their operations are predefi ned. 
Symbols are assigned values by the opera-
tions. A production system can be executed 
like a control structure. Assign the value of 
a to b: if b is less than or equal to c then do 
A, if it is larger do B. This formal production 
system may mimic the control structure of 
sounding an alarm if the temperature of the 
water is above a certain temperature. The ele-
ments of production systems, their symbols, 
and operations may change. One predefi ned 
symbol, operation, or combination can be 
substituted for another. In the case given, 
the value of b is replaced by the value of a, 
and the operation A is substituted for B. Any 
change is a determinate consequence of the as-
signed values established at the starting point 
of execution of the production. The symbols 
must remain within their limits and the opera-
tions within their defi nitions in order for the 
system to work according to the intentions of 
its designers.
As stated the formal systems are working 
inside themselves, independent of what is 
outside their limits. What is outside is unde-
fi ned. This means that what is inside is already 
known, while there is no way of identifying the 
nature of what comes in from the outside, ex-
cept to identify it as one of those elements ex-
isting inside. Further the value of what comes 
in is not necessarily limited. If the value is not 
checked it may allow the system to deviate or 
even destroy the system, the value is wrong. 
What is inside works, is defi ned according to 
the system, is right. In this sense the use of 
formal systems requires that what enters them 
must behave in specifi c ways such that it works 
right. The use of formal systems is a project of 
standardization, of normativity.
Thus, formal systems are isolated entities. 
They have an inside and an outside with no 
connection between the two. They form two 
different unconnected worlds, a situation that 
has been termed dualism. The isolation of the 
formal system is a consequence of its prede-
fi ned symbols and operations. It may change 
symbols or operators, it may substitute one 
element with another, but the elements are 
always of the same kinds as those defi ned at 
the starting point of its execution.
This is a big advantage of control structures, 
since it ensures that processes of the same kind 
always achieve identical results, as long as they 
work within the defi nitions of the production 
system and thus according to the designers’ 
intentions. The control structures are perfect 
and independent of what is outside their limits. 
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They achieve perfection through the isolation 
of their formal systems. But “the vengeance 
of the concrete” means that the control struc-
tures must deal with undefi ned elements. To 
be perfect in achieving identical results they 
must be isolated and work with well defi ned 
elements; to handle “the vengeance of the con-
crete” they must deal with undefi ned aspects. 
Their isolation is both a great advantage and 
a serious limitation.
This has been known for a long time. There 
are those who think that the limitations of the 
formal systems can be overcome (Newell & 
Simon, 72), or that we should wait and see 
(Harré 96) or that they are not really limiting 
at all. Here, it is argued that the requirements 
of closed systems and their consequences are 
problems of principle. The fact that formal 
systems are necessarily unreliable and fail to 
yield identical results with undefi ned symbols 
and operations is an indication of in-prin ciple 
limitations of formal systems that make their 
inability to handle “the vengeance of the con-
crete” inevitable. Confronted by the unknown, 
our understanding should not and does not al-
ways break down. We should be able to de-
velop and learn. We will need to fi nd processes 
of another nature in order to understand how 
we identify the undefi ned.
Regulating from 
the Control Room
There have been many attempts to identify the 
processes we are looking for, and which are an 
important aspect of regulating from the control 
room. The sheer number of attempts indicates 
that the process is still not well understood. 
Nevertheless, we can try to characterize it by 
examining empirical fi ndings and articulating 
principles as suggested by them.
Once I talked with the operators about 
how they identifi ed a problem during regula-
tion, how they came to know that something 
was wrong. This became a discussion of how 
they performed work related to the sounding of 
an alarm. Their fi rst and spontaneous response 
was that (closed) lists of possible problems are 
of no help. One can run them through to the 
end and still have no idea of what is going on 
(Axel, 2002, p. 328). We may add that a list of 
possible problems presuppose that somebody 
has found out in advance what could be the 
matter. A practical list is necessarily fi nite and 
short, and the operators know by experience 
that such a list is never suffi cient. There is al-
ways a possibility of at least a new twist on old 
problems. The operators also said that previous 
situations ought to be ignored. Only by investi-
gating the matter could they fi nd out. Problems 
in regulation could be anything, even unknown 
things. Preconceptions didnt help. However, 
to let go of preconceptions, that is, of what is 
already known, does not mean isolating one-
self. One must throw oneself into the situation, 
be able to work with connections, follow them 
in many directions, recognize that things are 
many-sided. One depends on the concreteness 
of things, on the connectedness of the world, 
of which one’s understanding is a part. Under-
standing cannot be stable. One must reorganize 
oneself according to the conditions, which do 
not remain the same. One must be able to de-
velop new conceptions that were not there at 
the start. On the other hand, new conceptions 
don’t come out of the blue. If that were the case, 
then the identifi cation of the unknown aspects 
of the situation would be arbitrary and acci-
dental, depending solely on chance. Since one 
can do something about it, although not always, 
one’s ability to identify the unknown must be 
connected to something, somehow. One must 
fi nd new ways on the basis of old, even when 
one tries to overlook them. Old elements are 
not exchanged for new ones, but new elements 
result from modifying what is there maintaining 
the situation. One acts in the situation, thereby 
modifying it. At the same time the situation is 
seen differently: the observer is himself modi-
fi ed. These are some of the reasons why a 
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human being is not a formal system.
We have talked about identifying a prob-
lem as a human achievement in which what is 
there is modifi ed, including the human being. 
It is important to see that the issues involved 
in identifying a problem are fundamental and 
extensive. They are about refl exivity and self-
modifi cation, characteristics that do not apply 
to formal systems. When formal systems refer 
to themselves, they break down. (Epimenides 
tells us that people from Crete lie. Epimenides 
is from Crete. Therefore he lies when he asserts 
that people from Crete lie. Therefore people 
from Crete speak the truth. Therefore it is true 
that people from Crete lie.) But any life form 
must in one way or another modify itself to fi nd 
out what is the matter and do something about 
it. This has been characterized as “the activ-
ity of self-maintenance through distinguishing 
itself from what is other, so that change comes 
about through internal development instead of 
through external determination” (Farrel, 1994, 
p. 17). In the dissertation the evolutionary as-
pects of this phenomenon were traced. We 
shall not go into this here. Instead, we shall 
examine the process as “the self-relating-in-re-
lating-to-otherness that characterizes thought” 
(ibid). In this examination we shall see repeat-
edly that identifi cations are achieved through 
connections. They thus become reciprocal dif-
ferentiations. If anything may be the matter, 
I must be prepared in the same act to modify 
anything in my relations, including the way I 
see myself and the things around me.
We are differentiating between man and 
machine, identifying what human beings 
do and machines don’t. We have identifi ed 
human beings’ refl exivity, the reciprocal 
modifi cation of what is involved in the iden-
tifi cation of things. Let us go further into the 
investigation by discussing a brief episode 
from a video tape recording from the control 
room (Axel, 2002, p. 274ff). Two operators 
are deliberating how to proceed in relation to 
a repair job. The recording is from a cold win-
ter morning. The operators were assessing the 
situation, the extensive use of heat, the water 
temperature, and resources needed to carry the 
water through the pipes. Two operators were 
recorded at their keyboards. They talked in 
front of the camera and their discussion was 
recorded. On the screen they can be seen delib-
erating the situation of a pump being repaired. 
They are concerned with how to modify the 
repair procedure so that it does not impede 
regulation as much as it does. It is apparent 
that their deliberations are not directed at the 
control structures of the high-tech plant, but at 
the question of how to arrange the technology 
in order to better follow rules for regulation 
and repairs. With this material we shall fi rst 
identify their subjective acts and their con-
nectedness; later we shall discuss connected 
acts, that is, praxis.
It is tempting to understand human acts as 
the execution of plans in the same manner as 
we understand that machines run according to 
their control structures. The act would then 
be a constant test of input information about 
the present state compared to the goal state. 
The act would follow the rules of the plan in 
a determinate way and it would not break any 
rule. In conceptions of this sort the agent is 
infl uenced by previous events, in our case, by 
the information about the present state. Such 
understandings are mainly found in psycholo-
gies that are more or less clearly open to for-
mal principles, as, for example, in cognitive 
psychology.
Following this conception we can see how 
the designers of the system have laid down 
rules for the operators to follow. There are offi -
cial documents stating how the workers should 
proceed, how the operators must stop a pump 
to be repaired, and how the repairmen must 
wait for the pump to cool down before they 
open it. The workers must follow the rules in 
this document and do nothing else. To demand 
this of the workers makes sense according to 
cognitive psychology, with its understanding 
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of acts as linear and isolated. According to 
cognitive psychology, solving the problem of 
how to do a job and the routine operations in-
volved in doing it can be separated. For people 
involved in such proceedings the hope is that 
the separation will ensure a solution of high 
quality that can be repeated with no errors.
But following a procedure automatically 
is only possible if conditions are well defi ned 
and don’t change. This is hardly ever the 
case. The repair servicing of the pump must 
be performed under contradictory conditions 
that are open to complex evaluations that take 
many different aspects – or many sides – of 
the situation into consideration. The repair 
involves an exchange of fi lters on the pump. 
Some nuts must be removed. The pump is full 
of hot water and the repairmen must wait until 
it cools down. But waiting means that the op-
erators have fewer pumps with which to move 
the water. In order to support the operators, the 
repair men unscrew the nuts while hot and thus 
run the risk of damaging them.
We see that the right procedure, to wait for 
the water to cool down, is wrong with respect 
to time used, and the right procedure with re-
spect to time used is potentially damaging the 
object of repair. The operators talk about the 
repair job because they have to accommodate 
the repair men while supplying end-users with 
hot water. As human beings they must act on 
previous experience but without any guarantee 
of suffi cient and necessary knowledge in this 
situation. Therefore the operators must do what 
they do: they discuss other possible arrange-
ments of the repairmen’s job. The operators 
must be prepared to organize the situation in 
other ways so that it better suits their abilities 
and what they have to do. The operators must 
be involved in rearranging their conditions of 
work, since their knowledge is partial and they 
need to know more to handle the variability.
Thus, in the observational material we can 
see that through their discussion the operators 
do more than react to what has happened a 
short time earlier or to what is happening at 
the moment. They are not acting in a stepwise 
pre-ordered sequence to reach a goal. They are 
not acting on a pre-established goal to which 
they need to relate, nor are their acts a formal 
test on how to reach such a goal. This par-
ticular morning they are deliberating aspects 
of the situation that they are not expected to 
deliberate. Anticipating what could impede 
regulation, they are deliberating other ways 
of doing things. This many-sided relation of 
apprehension to the situation is content-driven 
(Axel, 1997): the contradiction between repair 
and regulation is something about which they 
must decide. This relation of apprehension and 
the included self-modifi cation constitutes an 
initial identifi cation of subjectivity. Further, 
we see that what the operators apprehend are 
aspects of the situation meaningful to them and 
their regulation. As subjects they explore the 
possible meanings of the repair job as a condi-
tion for their regulation (Holzkamp, 1983). The 
meaning of the repair job appears as a dilemma 
in regulation to be solved anew each time.
The operators may be discussing the op-
tions for repair for the benefi t of the camera, 
but also decidedly because they must act in 
relation to the written rules laid down for 
them. In order to take the possible and many-
sided changes of conditions into account the 
operators will have to be sensitive to possible 
problems so that they can vary their acts while 
following the rule. The operators’ acts demon-
strate a constant interplay between regularity 
and variability. They break a rule because they 
must not follow it exactly the same way each 
time. We might even speak of unruly subjec-
tivity which breaks rules to keep them. The 
operators break the rules by doing something 
they are not supposed to do but must do. The 
operators think about the repair job; they refl ect 
on possible ways of doing it; they discuss how 
the repair men follow rules. In this we note 
several things.
First, we see a parallel between following 
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the rule and knowing the rule, between act and 
knowing. Acting and knowing are aspects of 
something more. When we act, we take part in 
societal and natural aspects of the world. We 
cannot oversee them completely, even though 
we need some kind of overview. This means 
that when we know, we never know enough, 
but we are under the constant obligation to 
know more. Meaning is part of something 
more, of societal and natural aspects of the 
world. The subject’s explorative relation to its 
constantly varied conditions means that its no-
tions are distinct, unfi nished, with a constant 
possibility for development.
Second, on the one hand the operators must 
follow the written rules, on the other they must 
vary the rules to accommodate their varied 
conditions. The regularity for which the rules 
were written is thus achieved by the operators 
varying their acts in order to compensate for 
varying conditions.
Third, it is these varied acts which force 
the operators to differentiate in various ways 
between the object and themselves. They (and 
we) know the world by being in it, by acting 
in it, they know it through their concrete or 
many-sided relations of their actions. It is 
all the specifi c aspects of the repair job that 
make them see the general implications for the 
rules and thus leads them to understand in new 
ways how the rules should work. The general 
appears through the specifi c concrete aspects 
of the situation. In the dissertation this is as-
serted by stating that meanings are the unity 
of the general and specifi c. This unity is not a 
determinate unity. One day, stable supply of 
water must be ensured when pumps with no 
back-up are stopped for repair. Another day, 
the stable supply must be ensured when a pipe 
is subjected to maintenance. There is an ac-
cidental aspect in the unity of the specifi c and 
the general: there are many different repair 
jobs, they vary, and each of them makes the 
regulation vary.
Fourth, we see that the isolation or closed-
ness of formal systems is gone. There is no 
dualism between the world on the one hand 
and the subjects acts and understanding on the 
other. The subject is part of the world, takes 
part in it, seeing and understanding it through 
its acts. I see the thing in itself as it appears 
for me. Since the general appears through the 
specifi c, since regularity is produced in vari-
able situations, we cannot tear our acts and 
understanding apart from each other. The 
general aspects of the situation are tied to the 
perspectives of the subject. The subject may 
see the general in many ways, depending on 
the perspective and the situation. This means 
that there is not one correct way of seeing or 
doing something; there are many ways of doing 
something, and they all contain truth.
Until now we have considered issues 
mainly from the point of view of an acting 
subject. But it has been implied that the subject 
is taking part in societal and natural aspects of 
the world about which it does not know eve-
rything. We shall use the term praxis for the 
connectedness of the acts of human beings, 
their objects, and their understanding (Bern-
stein, 1971), and when we talk of action we 
think of the anticipatory, intentional aspects of 
subjective acts that comprise praxis.
This distinction has several implications. 
Not only are psychological phenomena an 
aspect of praxis, but they must be understood 
as an aspect of the organization of praxis. The 
way we think takes form from the way we inter-
related and distribute our potentialities and how 
we distribute ourselves in our shared world. We 
have different outlooks on what goes on based 
on the way we relate to each other. In each per-
spective there is truth, and each perspective is 
based on ongoing praxis.
This means that the interconnectedness of 
human beings is contested, we have no way 
of deciding the nature of the interconnected-
ness except from ongoing praxis. To decide its 
nature once and for all would imply that it is 
fi xed and not modifi ed and that it is possible to 
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get a notion of it independent of the variations 
in praxis. But since this cannot be achieved, 
we must talk about praxis as differentiated 
subjective acts and their coherence from the 
perspective of a subject.
To sum up: We cannot describe praxis from 
an objective point of view. Therefore we must 
incorporate the understanding of the subject 
when discussing the praxis of people. At the 
same time we cannot describe an act in isola-
tion. We must describe the interconnectedness 
of acts in praxis.
The perspectives on praxis may take form 
from the way the acts of praxis are organized. 
In industrial plants some people arrange work 
procedures, while others must act according to 
these arrangements. In the district heating sys-
tem engineers designed or arranged the pipes 
and pumps of the system and others laid down 
rules for their use. The operators follow the 
rules and make the system work. We have 
three acts or work functions – designing, ar-
ranging and making the system work – that are 
differentiated aspects of the praxis of the dis-
trict heating system, each with its own perspec-
tive. Those who have arranged the work place 
tend to demand that the rules be followed with-
out question. In continuation of the formal ap-
proach they tend to see the operators’ acts as 
executing the rules.We have already seen that 
the operators know they are not simply fol-
lowing rules when they act. They must for-
get what they know and explore the problems 
to make things work according to rules (cf. In-
gold, 2000). Now, is it relativistic to claim that 
there is truth in both views? Does praxis be-
come whatever each acting person imagines? 
If we can leave the perspective of each partici-
pant in its own realm we have torn it away from 
praxis. Each perspective is connected to each 
other in praxis, forming each other according to 
the way the connections are understood. Those 
who have arranged the work place tend to want 
the operators to follow the plans without ques-
tion. The operators must make room for their 
exploration and therefore must make counter-
claims. Thus a conceptual dilemma about the 
understanding of praxis becomes the basis of 
confl ictual cooperation in praxis, and its out-
come depends on the conditions for coopera-
tion, the privileges involved and the way they 
are defended, but in the end, it depends on the 
nature of praxis. The confl ict may be reworked 
from any perspective, that of the engineers and 
operators as well from that of our observation 
of them. Nobody will be able to establish one 
absolute understanding of the problem as the 
proper understanding, but they have to work 
it out on the differences in praxis (cf. Dreier, 
1991, p. 202). When we see that the operators 
do not follow rules but understand them and re-
produce them constantly in their acts, then we 
must ask about the understanding of the sub-
jects in their praxis. We must question the idea 
that it is possible to prescribe for people rules 
that they simply have to follow; we have to re-
organize our thinking about designing and fol-
lowing rules according to our experience.
Thus the differentiation between machine 
and man is grounded as a practical problem 
of our time. The differentiation is historical: 
it depends on specifi c constellations of tech-
nology, privileges, and relations in praxis, and 
its differentiation can take many forms. The 
systematic, scientifi c investigation of the dif-
ferentiation takes its point of departure in his-
torical practical problems and incorporates the 
philosophical and scientifi c aspects involved.
The concrete many-sided aspect of praxis 
is explored further in the present paper. On the 
one hand each person’s praxis is concrete, it 
is a microcosm of the surrounding practices. 
On the other hand each person’s praxis is dis-
tributed, it is shaped specifi cally according to 
other persons’ particular variety of praxis and 
other local conditions.
To unravel what all this means it will be 
necessary to return to a deeper consideration 
of the observational material from my research 
on the control room.
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Design and Regulation are 
relations in acts and praxis
To sum up the argument to this point: We 
are identifying praxis as organized accord-
ing to the way we are distributed and how 
we distribute ourselves in our shared world. 
We see the subject as varying itself in order 
to produce stability under variable conditions. 
This means that acts cannot be a linear se-
quence that reaches pre-fi xed goals; they are 
many-sided processes according to changing 
conditions. Furthermore it means that acts do 
not come about by executing a fi xed set of 
rules; they re-produce the rules they follow. 
We shall explore some consequences of this 
understanding. The many-sided connectedness 
of acts and their constant re-production of rules 
make acts contradictory: they are stable and 
varied. Their stability is re-produced through 
their variation. This means that an act is not 
simply a realization of a fi xed control struc-
ture, nor is the act simply solving a problem. 
It is not only something in itself, it is related 
to other acts, it takes form from these, and is 
mediated by them. Each act is a variation of 
all other acts.
We can therefore proceed by identifying as 
many aspects of acts as we fi nd relevant in the 
dialogue between the operators recorded on 
video. We shall mention those aspects we have 
met when discussing how the operators re-pro-
duce rules. We see that unruly subjectivity is 
not abstractedly destructive; it is productive 
by destroying one way of doing things. The 
operators don’t perform uniform routine acts, 
and they do more than the problem solving of 
cognitive science. They discuss how their work 
problems should be posed, by discussing the 
connections of their work. They are involved 
in how to make rules work by modifying them, 
by organizing things.
Furthermore, deliberating how to make the 
repair job run more smoothly, they discuss 
changing the installation. The newcomer has 
an expensive solution: a backup pump should 
be installed. This would make it possible to 
stop the pump to be repaired well in advance 
of the repair so that it could cool down. The 
experienced operator has a less expensive so-
lution: wingnuts. The operators’ discussion 
is a redesign of the pump from an operators 
perspective on the repair job.
Also, their discussion can be seen as an at-
tempt to identify an error. Where is the source 
of the problem located? In the time constraints, 
in the design of the pump, in the handling of 
the dilemma? Their perspective was clarifi ed 
for me by some other operators. I took it to be 
an implicit comment on the engineers’ way 
of thinking. It is often said that the operators 
make errors when regulating because they 
break rules. But why doesn’t anybody discuss 
the way the machinery is built? This is what 
the operators try to do, making room for their 
own work by modifying the machinery. They 
try to remake their conditions of work in order 
to work better.
We see, that the act of discussing the repair 
job apparently contains all the aspects involved 
in the repair job: unruly subjectivity follow-
ing rules by breaking them, laying down rules, 
error identifi cation, repair, design, organizing 
conditions. These aspects are differentiations 
of acts, deeply related: if one can only follow 
rules by breaking them, one is constantly re-
producing them, committing errors, perform-
ing repair or redesigning and organizing praxis. 
These differentiations are made more marked 
and stable by the division of labour. Through 
the division of labour the differentiations are 
apparently extracted from acts and laid out as 
relations between them in praxis: some people 
design, others lay down rules, etc.. To many, 
the differentiations appear as separate elements 
in connected acts: those designing don’t fol-
low rules, those following rules don’t design. 
But we cannot separate the differentiations, 
they are indispensable aspects of the subjec-
tive act of re-producing rules. This point I see 
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as general in relation to human acts: an act of 
any nature contains all aspects necessary for 
its completion, even though the aspects may 
be dispersed among acts in praxis, and at the 
same time the involved aspects are shaped 
specifi cally in each act according to relations 
in praxis.
We shall consider the relation between acts 
with different aspects enhanced and shaped 
specifi cally according to relations in praxis. 
We shall focus on how the operators re-pro-
duce rules in regulation. If acts are all varia-
tions of each other and connected in continuous 
varied repetition, we may wonder about the 
relation between an act and its context, which 
also contains other acts being concrete varia-
tions of the act on which we are focused. Each 
act takes form from its context. At the same 
time an act is recognizable as something in it-
self. Furthermore, the relation between context 
and act is accidental and necessary: the reason 
that the operator must use this pump here is 
accidental and necessary in many respects. For 
example the pump is there since it was avail-
able due to many accidental circumstances at 
the time of purchase. Also, it is a more or less 
good compromise between specifi cations and 
what was available. It is this openness which 
makes development possible. The way the 
pump meets specifi cations and the way con-
ditions signify to the operators that they can 
improve their work make them discuss what 
can be done, as we have seen on the video 
recording. Such implications of the relation 
between the arbitrary and the necessary are 
very central. This is more so when they are 
not limited to video recorded conversations, 
but concern more important issues of develop-
ment. The implications force us to investigate 
the relation between an act and its context.
We shall fi rst look at the nature of specifi c 
personal regulatory acts in which operators re-
produce rules. They are something in them-
selves, not isolated entities. They may turn 
into what they are not, they may develop, and 
they are concrete. Therefore each act is also its 
contradiction, the act of following rules is com-
mitting errors, since following rules implies 
breaking them and breaking a rule means com-
mitting an error. The act of committing errors 
is following rules, since the identifi cation of 
errors is to specify the meaning of the situation, 
how to handle it, and thereby to re-establish 
the broken rule. To accommodate repairmen 
is to follow rules, but it also means to com-
mit an error, since the repairmen cannot get 
access to the pump exactly according to their 
requirements. To deliberate the repair job is 
an error since one is not allowed to. But at the 
same time it is to follow rules, since it opens 
up relevant ways of accommodating the repair 
men. If any personal practice is a variation of 
all other practices, this is of course due to the 
fact that a human being is acting and that the 
act is concrete. Since an act is a concrete dif-
ferentiation and since it constantly develops, 
it will accord with itself as a contradiction, 
consequence, etc.
An act in itself is then contradictory. The 
relation of a personal act to the acts of others 
must now be specifi ed. To follow rules leads to 
errors, and erring leads to following rules. This 
not only means that deliberating the repair job 
and making wrong conclusions in this instance 
may lead to erroneous acts by other operators 
elsewhere. More importantly, it indicates the 
many-sided connections of acts. To accom-
modate the repairmen appropriately may lead 
to unstable supply to consumers and thereby 
to error, to accommodate the repairmen erro-
neously by allowng them to unscrew the bolts 
before they are cool may lead to correct sup-
ply. Such dilemmas never fi nd a solution, but 
the contradictory requirements are a source of 
constant change and development of acts.
An act not only leads to other acts. The 
relations among acts in praxis form their con-
text and constitute the acts. We can say that 
errors take form according to the rule which 
has been followed, and rules take form accord-
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ing to the errors that have been committed. 
The unstable supply of heat is formed to some 
extent according to the way the repairmen are 
accommodated, and specifying rules that do 
not damage the pump may produce unstable 
supply of heat. Thus aspects of praxis arbi-
trarily related to each other, like heat supply 
and pump repair, are reciprocally constituting 
acts. But this does not mean that the consti-
tution is arbitrary. Differentiating the aspects 
also means identifying a common and varied 
principle of regulation: heat supply and pump 
repair result from distributing social resources 
as a matter of technical arrangements. Such a 
principle is in itself contradictory. The reduc-
tion of social issues to quantitative technical 
matters assumes a stable social praxis and a 
distribution of privileges which makes it pos-
sible for everyone to participate more or less in 
the management of conditions. This becomes 
clear when there is breakdown of regular 
principles of distribution. For example, in 
other district heating systems we might fi nd 
pumps that cannot move the water as required 
because somebody needed the proper pump 
somewhere else and had replaced it with an 
improper one. Yes, the nuts in the bad pump 
could have been removed, since somebody ur-
gently needed them elsewhere, so that the bad 
pump did not work as required. Such fi ndings 
belie the technical principles of distribution 
and point to serious problems in the distribu-
tion of social resources.
But it is not only here that somebody re-
produces a rule. A rule may be re-produced at 
different locations. A rule is dispersed in praxis 
according to its relevance and the resources 
already distributed. The rule for servicing the 
pump can be re-produced wherever there are 
pumps without backups in the system needing 
exchange of fi lters and the repairmen have to 
refer to the control room. The rules are dis-
persed in praxis, they are not lying around on 
location waiting for someone to come and be 
governed by them.
These deliberations point to praxis as a 
reciprocally constituted many-sided phe-
nomenon. Only the dilemma around the re-
production of rules in regulation has been 
discussed. But earlier it was pointed out that 
the operators’ video-recorded discussion was 
at the same time a re-production of rules, error 
identifi cation, repair, design, re-arranging con-
ditions etc. This means that each subject’s acts 
can only be understood by differentiations in 
praxis, that each subject’s praxis is concrete 
and many-sided and contains the aspects of the 
others. There are several important ramifi ca-
tions of these conclusions. Here I shall only 
mention two. The fi rst ramifi cation concerns 
the differentiation of subjects in praxis. Earlier, 
we mentioned the confl ictual cooperation at 
a work place between those who arrange the 
work place and those who re-produce rules. 
More specifi cally it was said that the engineers 
tend to believe that the operators only follow 
rules. Actually, however, they are performing a 
complex function to make the rule work. They 
arrange conditions to better the possibilities for 
their own work; they grasp what other people 
do from their own perspective. This means 
that under specifi c conditions they will also 
be able to perform the work functions of the 
other workers without instructions (cf. Lave & 
Wenger, 1991). To specify when this is possi-
ble remains for future study. The second rami-
fi cation concerns the understanding of social 
systems. It is an aspect of our conception of 
praxis that the differentiation of reciprocally 
constituted acts in praxis in turn constitutes 
and develops the social system. This analysis 
is inspired by Marx’ discussion of production, 
consumption, distribution etc. in his General 
Introduction (MEW 13, pp. 623ff). He argues 
that any consumption is a production, any pro-
duction a consumption, that production and 
consumption are required of each other in prax-
is, are reciprocally constituted, that production 
and consumption are distributed according to 
previously distributed resources and privileges, 
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and that the products are dispersed. I see analy-
sis of reciprocally constituted differentiations 
in praxis as an opening for the understanding 
of social systems as containing phenomena 
not present in the acts of the individual and at 
the same time based on reciprocal acts of the 
individual. This is, however, something to be 
pursued in future work.
Here we shall limit ourselves to noting 
a central issue in understanding the relation 
between distributed acts and social systems. 
When acting, the operators take part in the 
workings of the plant. Even though we focus 
on the operators’ deliberations about the repair 
we get a sense that their opinions are differenti-
ated in relation to other workgroups and their 
perspectives on the situation. The dilemma of 
the repair job entails different requirements to 
which different work groups will relate dif-
ferently. There are disagreements in the con-
versation on the video tape and made explicit 
in other contexts. These disagreements are 
worked on in confl ictual cooperation. Different 
kinds of acts may coordinate things differently: 
to act here I may have to change things there so 
that I can act more effectively here. This way 
of being involved is one way of participating 
in the common management of common con-
ditions, which is termed action potence. Since 
each of us wants to change the order of things, 
we become conditions to each other and we 
participate in the mediation of things. In each 
situation there is a possibility of restricting the 
possible arrangements to one’s own way of 
arranging and seeing things, or a possibility 
of fi nding more comprehensive arrangements 
and understandings. Restricting the possible 
arrangements means struggling to demonstrate 
that one arrangement is right, good, and valid, 
while others are not. In such cases the concrete 
aspects of the general arrangement are over-
looked; the arrangement is exclusive. If the 
engineers insist that the prescribed procedure 
should be followed, they would be obliged 
to say why it is the best solution. Finding a 
comprehensive arrangement means fi nding a 
concrete one, in which the perspectives in the 
common, differentiated praxis may become 
confl ictually coordinated in new ways, open-
ing up the possibility of wider participation 
in the arrangement. To mediate between not 
damaging the nuts and getting the fi lters ex-
changed quickly means incorporating different 
contested perspectives on the repair without 
ever fi nding THE solution, but always fi nding 
a good one. The struggle between restrictive 
and comprehensive solutions may furthermore 
involve issues of privileged resources and of 
recognizing other interests than one’s own. It is 
in the struggle for restrictive or comprehensive 
arrangements that societal issues are mediated, 
maintained, and developed.
Before concluding, two comments must be 
made about the conception of notions present-
ed. We are accustomed to think that notions 
are homogenous and consistent, thus ensur-
ing that they can be handled by formal logic. 
However, in order to understand development 
and acts as taking part in praxis we have had 
to allow that notions are contradictory and 
unfi nished. Much confusion appears to arise 
from this move. Here the following two issues 
will be noted.
The notion of rule-following as incomplete 
and therefore possibly developing has been 
characterized as rule breaking. This indicates 
that a notion is not a homogeneous, delimited 
substance, but is distinct, unfi nished, concrete, 
and its own contradiction. This presumably 
creates problems. Notions may turn into each 
other: error identifi cation may become design. 
The stability of notions becomes a problem if 
they mix promiscuously and we have no way 
of deciding what they mean. From the analytic 
point of view this problem must defi nitely be 
avoided. But the way we handle it in everyday 
thinking demonstrates, that, in fact, the prob-
lem is only apparent. In the situation we have 
no trouble identifying the concrete, contradic-
tory meaning of an act. When a designer talks 
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about the essentials of design and claims that 
we all design – and this can be seen in every-
day discussions such as about which nuts to 
use on pumps – we all understand that the act 
of discussing nuts is designing. Some would 
claim that design has a special meaning that 
does not include worksite discussions among 
operators, and that it is only similar to design. 
They miss the point that the operators’ ideas 
may be a good solution that can be followed 
up by redesigning the pump. Also, when an 
engineer claims that regulation is following 
rules with no discussion and that the opera-
tors commit an error by discussing, we all 
understand that discussing is not redesigning 
but an error. Some of us would claim that it is 
not really an error, since the discussion points 
to relevant issues, even if the suggested solu-
tions are wrong. But we would miss the point, 
that discussing is an error since it may disturb 
their accommodating the repairmen. We must 
therefore maintain that concepts are as stable 
as praxis, that they change with relevancies 
in praxis.
We also note that when talking about de-
velopment we may appear to cheat. If individ-
ual praxis contains all aspects in a many-sided 
concrete activity, we may as well claim that 
there can be no development, since everything 
is there before development starts. We have 
substituted development with change. When 
something changes, as when nuts are changed 
on a pump, the location goes from one state 
to the other, from ordinary nut to wing nut. If 
there is a wing nut after a change, there can be 
no ordinary nut on that location. Furthermore, 
one cannot see on the wing nut that the ordi-
nary nut was there before. Change is concerned 
with one aspect, and the aspect of the begin-
ning has to disappear to make the aspect of the 
end be present. There is no connection between 
before and after, and there are not necessari-
ly more aspects after a change. To understand 
development we cannot study the mechanical 
aspects of substituting things, we must incor-
porate their meaning in praxis; we must actu-
ally focus on praxis. Development is driven by 
dilemmas, and it may take place in this local 
praxis or in that one over there, or that one, or 
that one.. all of which share dilemmas with this 
one. A development could also mark itself by 
the local praxis over there having dilemmas of 
another nature mediated by those in this local 
praxis, so that they want to do something about 
our praxis. The dilemma of repairing pumps 
and supplying heat can modify praxis in many 
ways. When ordinary nuts are substituted with 
wing nuts, the praxis around repairing pumps 
and supplying heat is modifi ed or develops. De-
velopment is a modifi cation of concrete, many-
sided praxis in which many aspects from before 
can be recognized in the after. When something 
develops, what is there is reorganized. The re-
organization may mean that something is lost or 
something new appears, and much in the result 
can be recognized although modifi ed. Develop-
ment is thus a continuous process in which each 
stage is dependent on differentiations around it 
and at the same time is becoming a new way of 
working that is a modifi cation of the old way in 
response to the dilemmas. Development shows 
a connection between before and after. It may 
be a differentiation of what was there before, 
that is, a more detailed procedure may appear, 
or it may be a simplifi cation, a collapse, a with-
ering away of unnecessary procedures. How-
ever, there is no repeated sequence of stages. 
Development may take many courses. Nobody 
claims that switching to wing nuts is the nec-
essary solution to the problem; it is simply an 
available solution, a developing praxis. Other 
solutions, like a backup pump, would also get 
things going. We note that since development 
is concrete it is based on something which is 
there before development and can be recog-
nized in the new situation after development. 
This means that we are not cheating when we 
presume everything at the beginning. We must 
simply specify how everything was differen-
tiated and modifi ed when things became reor-
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ganized. An implication of these deliberations 
is that social analysis should focus on present 
problems and their possible solutions. To set up 
utopias, to ground present acts in visions of the 
future may mean overlooking present contra-
dictions in social conditions which must be in-
corporated in order to fi nd realistic alternative 
ways of doing things.
Conclusion
An empirical study of regulation in the control 
room of a district heating system was the basis 
for presenting an action-based conception of 
human beings. The paper took its point of de-
parture from the fact that fallible human beings 
are trusted to handle anomalies in high-tech 
plants that run with a perfection not attainable 
by human beings. This confrontation between 
man and machine provided an opportunity to 
differentiate between the control structures of 
machines that follow formal logic and the self-
modifying thinking of human beings. Formal 
logic is characterized as abstract and isolated. 
Its symbols and operations must be given in 
advance in order that it runs properly. There-
fore it cannot develop while running. Human 
beings handling anomalies must take part, 
explore, and make connections in order to 
develop their unfi nished understanding of 
the anomalous situations. Human beings take 
part by – among other things – arranging their 
conditions for acting and participating in the 
common management of conditions. Their 
acts in praxis are shaped by and give shape 
to their understanding. This means that each 
understanding is a situated perspective on 
praxis. It also means that there may be differ-
ent understandings of what goes on. On the one 
hand engineers claim that the operators should 
only follow rules, on the other the operators 
must make the rules work. The different per-
spectives mean that cooperation is confl ictual 
and the outcome depends on the conditions of 
praxis and how the nature of praxis appears in 
the cooperation. The scientifi c investigation of 
the differentiation between man and machine 
is a systematic reworking of these problems 
in praxis.
Some exploration of concrete many-sided 
praxis is attempted. It is argued that an act of 
any nature contains all aspects necessary for 
its completion, even though the aspects may 
be dispersed among acts in praxis, and at the 
same time the involved aspects are shaped 
specifi cally in each act according to relations 
in praxis.
It is further stressed that therefore the divi-
sion of labour cannot mean that some subjects 
only design and plan, while others execute the 
plan by following rules. When we are investi-
gating those who are supposedly only follow-
ing rules, the possibility always exist, given 
favourable conditions, that without instruction 
they will also be able to perform the work func-
tions of other participants without instructions. 
The grasp of other work functions they have 
gained by performing their own work belies 
that they are simply following rules as con-
ceived by the formal conception.
It is lastly argued that the reciprocal differ-
entiations of action in praxis is a key to under-
standing the relation between social systems 
and subjective acts.
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